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Article 7

The Law and
Black Folk
Katy L. Chiles
Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture
and the Police Power after Slavery
by Bryan Wagner. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
2009. Pp. 307. $37.00 cloth.

Ever since W. E. B. Du Bois published The Souls of Black Folk in
1903, scholars have deliberated over
what it means to have a soul, to be
black, or to be part of the folk. In
Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture
and the Police Power after Slavery,
Bryan Wagner gives us a new way
to consider these issues that is provocative and, indeed, disturbing.
Blackness, Wagner claims, is not
something passed down through
bloodlines or as a cultural inheritance; rather, it is a certain type of
statelessness produced when one
is allowed to exist—but only without standing—in the eyes of the
state. Furthermore, it is this understanding of blackness (one of statelessness, not of soulfulness) that
grounds what we commonly call
the black vernacular tradition. Indeed, this version of the black tradition predicates its own emergence
on its engagement with the law
that would construct the existence
of its practitioners only as one of
criminality. For Wagner, if we miss
understanding this aspect of blackness, we miss the violence recorded
in these cultural expressions.
Wagner proposes this alternative history of the black vernacular
tradition by debunking some of
what he calls the central myths of
its accepted history and by detailing the ethnographic procedure
that made certain kinds of music
into folk music (253). He begins by
showing the way in which the laws
arising out of a natural law tradition
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produced a particular notion of
blackness. For him, the term police
power refers not just to the formalized institution of law enforcement
(although it certainly includes that)
but also more broadly to the power
of the state to produce certain types
of subjectivities through the writing and enforcing of law. Indeed,
the state’s sovereignty relates to its
police power, and, in the particular
case of blackness, the state’s police
power sees blackness only “for the
presumed danger it poses to public welfare” (6–7). Furthermore,
this power was not only consolidated in the state itself, as it was
extended as a “racial privilege of
all whites over all blacks, slave or
free” (7). Because this police power
conceptualized blackness only as a
threat, it legitimated any effort to
eliminate that potential threat preemptively before it could culminate
in action. For Wagner, the black
vernacular tradition arises out of
its interaction with this kind of
legal thinking, and we’d be better
served by understanding how black
culture responded to police power
rather than by misunderstanding
“the voice’s insistence for a positive
property such as soulfulness” (21).
Indeed, as Wagner states,
[M]y aim is to specify the
historical statement against
which the black tradition
has dramatized its own
emergence. Whether it is abstracted in codes or embedded

in cases, the law leaves a paper
trail that can be used to reconstruct the historical coordinates that are invoked in
the tradition’s representative
structures of self-address. (21)
One of Wagner’s most powerful examples is the history of Uncle
Remus, the African American
character created by Joel Chandler
Harris in Atlanta at the close of the
nineteenth century. Probably many
Americans think of Uncle Remus
either as the storyteller featured in
Harris’s Uncle Remus, His Songs
and His Sayings (1880) or as the demeaning narrator featured in Disney’s 1946 film, Song of the South.
What Wagner reminds us of, however, is the seriousness with which
folklorists took the Uncle Remus
stories for their “scientific worth”
(116). As Wagner details, Remus
became structurally important
both to the study of black folk culture and to the professionalization
of that type of study. Remus, then,
influenced folklorists’ “theories of
black tradition, in particular those
theories that would describe the
tradition as a cultural inheritance
from Africa;” indeed, he “structured the archive through which
the tradition has been imagined”
(122). By reading through issues of
the Atlanta Constitution, the newspaper that initially published Harris’s Remus pieces, Wagner links
the production of this character
with the debate simultaneously
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raging in the newspaper over the
power of the police. For Atlanta
to become the “beacon of southern
enlightenment” (128) that it was
destined to be and for the South to
move from the ancient time of slavery into that of the modern world,
the Constitution argued, its citizens
must surrender their individual
rights of violence (even former
white slaveholders who felt they
were obliged to administer justice
on their own plantations) to the
state. In other words, as Wagner
explains, to move from living in a
state of natural warfare (as the natural law tradition would have it)
to living in a civilized community,
white citizens had to abandon “the
racial entitlement to personal violence” to the state and its organized
police units.Abandoning their presumed rights to administer violence
as they saw fit, white citizens’ relinquishing their right to violence to
the state did not just bring Atlanta
into civilization; it also provided
a convenient and much-needed
workforce to labor on community
development projects through
the brutal convict-leasing system.
When some citizens were hesitant
to relinquish their assumed prerogative to violence either because
they did not trust the lower-class
men who often served as the police
or because they had grown accustomed to perpetrating racial violence themselves, the Constitution
worked to convince readers that
they needed the police because the
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black migrants moving into Atlanta posed “a threat that only the
police could handle” (138). Thus,
as Wagner details, this newspaper’s discourse helped characterize
vagrants as threatening criminals
who the justice system would then
convict and turn into free labor for
the city, all the while modernizing
Atlanta as the civilized center of
the New South. Black newspapers
such as the Savannah Tribune were
quick, of course, to point out how
the state was profiting materially
from its judicial practices, and they
characterized the transfer of power
from the slaveholder to the nationstate not as a radical break into the
modern (as the Constitution would
have it) but rather as a continuation
of the “state of war” of slavery that
was supposed to end, according to
natural law theory, when the nation-state was established. (This, of
course, as the Tribune pointed out,
did not in fact happen because the
police continued to wage war on
the black community.)
When Harris then began publishing Uncle Remus pieces in the
Constitution, Remus was initially
not a folk storyteller but rather a
resident expert on race issues who
voiced the newspaper’s opinion on
the need for police power. Thus,
as Wagner states, “Uncle Remus
was not merely contiguous to the
newspaper’s campaign for the
police—he was part of it” (154).
Remus spoke out against black
migrants and for the police; only
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later did he morph into a plantation storyteller. Wagner, then, reads
the Remus stories, such as those of
Brer Rabbit and Brer Fox, in the
context not only of slave life but
also of the urban battles occurring
between the Atlanta police and
its perceived-as-threatening black
vagrants. When Remus concurs
with the police about the necessity of criminalizing vagrants who
lived without working in formal
employment situations, these subsistence practices were not only
“criminalized by the government,
and pathologized in the Constitution,” but also “projected into the
vernacular tradition” (165). Thus,
within the pages of the Constitution, Remus’s tales stood both for
Africa and (with their emphasis
on wily animals ostensibly needing
discipline administered from an
outside authority) for a world that
Atlanta, with its new police force
working to control black vagrancy,
was quickly moving beyond. The
newspaper, then, “could offer a
hypothesis about the modern state,
and it could make the black tradition into folklore” (168). This is
problematic enough, of course, but
for Wagner, even if we can now
dismiss Uncle Remus as a caricature created by a white folklorist,
we still have not yet come to terms
with how Remus (so central to the
professionalization of folklore and
to the establishment of blackness as
a cultural inheritance) structured

the way that many ethnographers
have practiced the “collecting” of
“authentic” black vernacular culture ever since.
In this riveting chapter, as
throughout the rest of the book,
Wagner combines close reading,
archival research, legal analysis,
and theorization in a richly interdisciplinary project. He is a patient
writer, revealing aspects of his argument as they arise, which thus
rewards patient reading. In his
other chapters, he analyzes other
myths about the black vernacular
tradition, such as songwriter W. C.
Handy’s account of overhearing a
black vagrant singing while waiting for a train. Here, Wagner explains how Handy established the
measure of vernacular authenticity as a measure of how much the
singer can embody what he sings.
Once slavery is abolished, the most
“authentic” singer of folksongs becomes the vagrant who, criminalized by the law, quickly becomes
the prisoner. This allowed future
collectors to mistake what Wagner characterizes as “the mnemonics that enabled informants
to sing themselves from incapacity into hypothetical existence,” a
particular kind of stylized artifice,
for a celebrated “authentic selfexpression” that has continued to
“orient . . . collectors to their informants” (57). In the case of BrasCoupé, a legendary fugitive slave
who was said to live in the swamps
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outside of New Orleans, Wagner
shows how George Washington
Cable’s removing of Bras-Coupé’s arrest from Place d’Armes to
Congo Square in The Grandissimes
(1879–80) not only represses the
role the police played in Bras-Coupé’s legend (and how the image of
Bras-Coupé was used by the city
government to legitimate its use
of police power) but also contributes to the mischaracterization of
Congo Square in the historiography of jazz as the birthplace of the
jazz tradition. Wagner also restores
the role that police terror played in
the production of what was taken
as cultural practice in his examination of how John and Alan Lomax
loaded a phonograph into their
vehicle and took it into penitentiaries throughout the South in order
to record the music produced by
black prisoners. For Wagner, “[b]y
proposing that prisoners were the
last folk singers and prisons were
the only remaining repositories for
black authenticity, Lomax transformed the legal imperatives that
defined black tradition into cultural
properties” (217). By bringing the
police power back into view, Wagner helps us to understand how
the “ethnographic framework” has
“too often limited the meaning of
the black tradition” (237).
Wagner is in conversation with
important scholars likewise interested in blackness, aesthetics, the
role of terror, and the history of
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music, such as Fred Moten, Kevin
Bell, Saidiya Hartman, and Alex
Weheliye. Wearing his knowledge
lightly, he also brilliantly draws
upon and builds on the insights of
theorists such as Michel Foucault,
Louis Althusser, Walter Benjamin,
and Gayatri Spivak. It is clear, for
instance, how Giorgio Agamben’s
thinking on sovereignty and on
the figure of homo sacer has influenced Wagner’s compelling work.
Indeed, in part because of the various conversations that Wagner is in
and because of the implications of
his arguments for a number of different fields, readers might want
to hear more about the theoretical
implications of Wagner’s trenchant
argument, particularly for some
of the axiomatic texts of literary
criticism. Granted, Wagner states
early on that his examples are not
meant to stand in for the entirety
of the black tradition (22), and he
does briefly address how Du Bois
was impacted by and then turned
away from Joel Chandler Harris’s
folkloric work. Nevertheless, we
are still led to ask what Wagner’s
work might mean for our reading
of texts like Henry Louis Gates’s
The Signifying Monkey (1988) and
the rhetorical mode of signifyin(g).
African American literary studies has broadened in so many ways
from that moment, but, because
The Signifying Monkey was so foundational, Wagner’s analysis begs the
question of how we might need to
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rethink some of the assumptions of
this important text. I offer this less
as a critique than as an example of
how the implications of Wagner’s
work might be extended even further. Overall, this book’s interdisciplinary nature and the implications
of its far-reaching argument for a

number of disciplines make necessary reading for scholars of history,
law, music, ethnography, literary
criticism, and African American
studies most broadly.
Katy L. Chiles teaches in English and Afri
cana Studies at the University of Tennessee.

